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system which in practice makes that flexibility a sham. It is
also difficult to understand how the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service could be permitted to apply the resettlement factor
without any sign of legislative disapproval if Congress had intended
the contrary. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that a system
which contains serious disadvantages for the homeless refugee
would only be adopted with a clear expression of congressional in-
tent as to the desired result. Otherwise, the result is absurd.
The statute, as written, may permit settled persons to qualify
for refugee status. On balance, however, it is highly questionable
whether Congress contemplated such a result.
ROBERT A. MAUTiNo
CIVIL RIGHTS-STATE AcTION-CUSTOMs HAVING THE FORCE OF
LAW BY VIRTUE OF PERSISTENT PRACTICES OF STATE OFFICIALS
CONSTrrUTE STATE ACTION. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Com-
pany (U.S. 1970).
Plaintiff-petitioner, Sandra Adickes, a white volunteer summer
Freedom School teacher and full time teacher in the New York City
School System, brought an action against S.H. Kress and Com-
pany in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York" to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 for an
alleged violation of her civil rights. Miss Adickes and six Negro
students attempted to use the Hattiesburg, Mississippi library fa-
cilities3 and then, while under police surveillance, proceeded to
the local Kress store to eat lunch. The Kress waitress, under or-
ders from the store manager, took the orders of the Negro students,
but refused to serve petitioner. The waitress stated: "We have to
position to provide for himself and his family in this country. Indeed, he
has been doing so for the past eight years." 295 F. Supp. at 1372 (emphasis
added). The implication is that he had been gainfully employed since his
entry into the United States. A temporary visitor who fails to maintain
his status is deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (9) (1964).
1. Adickes v. S.11. Kress & Co., 252 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 252 F. Supp. at 142. Petitioner and her Negro students were denied
use of the public library, at which time it was closed by the police.
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serve Negroes, but we are not serving whites who come in with
them."4 After refusal of service, Miss Adickes and her students
left the store, whereupon she was immediately arrested and charged
with vagrancy.5
Miss Adickes alleged that she had been deprived of her right
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment not
to be discriminated against on the basis of race., Her complaint
set out two counts; one charged that Kress denied her the equal
enjoyment of a place of public accommodation because of her as-
sociation with Negroes and the second alleged that Kress conspired
with the Hattiesburg police to deprive her of constitutional rights.
The district court dismissed the conspiracy count before trial on a
motion for summary judgment and directed verdict for Kress at
the close of petitioner's case.1 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision, holding that there was insufficient state
encouragement of racial discrimination to permit petitioner to re-
cover under the "color of state law" clause of section 1983.8
Certiorari was granted,9 and on hearing by the United States Su-
preme Court, held, reversed and remanded: to sustain an action
under section 1983 there must be encouragement of the discrim-
ination in the form of "state action" and this may be shown by
proving the existence of a state enforced "custom" that commanded
or motivated the particular act of discrimination. Adickes v. S.H.
Kress and Company, 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
The present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted as section 1 of the Ku
Klux Act of 1871.10 It was described by the Chairman of the House
4. Id. at 143.
5. Achtenberg v. Mississippi, 393 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1968) (remanded
with directions that the criminal charges be dismissed). The police were
informed of petitioner's employment and financial solvency at the time of
arrest.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
7. 252 F. Supp. at 144. The Court determined that Miss Adickes failed
to allege any facts from which a conspiracy might be inferred.
8. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121, 125 (2nd Cir. 1968).
9. 394 U.S. 1011 (1969).
10. Ku Klux Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
Select Committee, which drafted this legislation,1 as modeled after
section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866:12 a criminal provision
that also contained language which forbade certain acts by any
person "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom." The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted during the
reconstruction era and the obvious congressional intent was to
eliminate the evils of state encouraged discrimination. In 1871,
faced with the terrorist tactics of the Ku Klux Klan, Congress en-
acted additional civil rights legislation in the form of the Ku
Klux Act. Section 1 of this act provided for damages relief for pri-
vate discrimination. It is not clear whether Congress intended this
section to be directed at acts of discrimination that were purely
private in nature or to be directed at state encouraged discrimi-
nation.' 3 However, the judicial interpretation of both the 1866
and the 1871 Acts is that state encouragement in the form of
"state action" is a necessary requirement to their application.
The Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases'4 held that the 1866
Act was constitutional under the fourteenth amendment and there-
by subject to the amendment's limitations.'5 The Court held that
the fourteenth amendment cannot be used to sanction legislation
which compels a private citizen not to discriminate on the basis of
race. The amendment was interpreted as applying only to dis-
crimination by the states. Therefore, with section 1983 being
founded upon the 1866 Act, it is legislation authorized by the four-
teenth amendment'6 and limited to a requirement of "state action."
Section 1983 is, by its own language, limited to activity "under
11. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871) (statement by
Representative Shellabarger).
12. Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
13. For a thorough examination of the legislative history and intent of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 1871 Ku Klux Act, see, Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, in 1868, the con-
stitutional legality of the 1866 Act had to spring from the thirteenth
amendment. Had this legislation been declared constitutional under the
thirteenth amendment it could have been directed at acts of individuals,
whether sanctioned by "state action" or not. However, there was doubt
as to this act being fully authorized by that amendment. When the four-
teenth amendment was adopted, it became obvious that this legislation
was at least constitutional under that amendment. Therefore the Court
never found the necessity to inquire as to the constitutionality of the 1866
Act under the thirteenth amendment. Thus, the crucial question of which
amendment controlled the 1866 Act was resolved in favor of the fourteenth
amendment and the requirement of "state action" to show a violation of
civil rights was established.
16. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5, states in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
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color" of law. In cases under this section "under color" of law has
consistently been treated as the equivalent of the "state action"
required by the fourteenth amendment.17 There has been a con-
sistency of treating the two phrases as synonymous, but the only
thing constant about the concept of "state action" has been change.
Originally the interpretation was that only action authorized
under state law fell within the purview of the statute.'8 The
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation in United States v.
Classic,19 a criminal case which required interpretation of the
phrase "under color" of law. The Court held that misuse of power
by one clothed with authority of state law was action "under color"
of state law.20 Further change was brought about by the Court in
Screws v. United States,2' where it held that "under color" of law
meant under pretense of law.22 In Monroe v. Pape,23 the Screws
and Classic tests were applied and a civil action under section
1983 was allowed against police officers for an illegal search and
detention. Conduct is "under color" of state law if those persons
engaged in the activity are clothed with the authority of the state
and are purporting to act thereunder, whether or not the conduct
complained of was authorized or, indeed, even if it was proscribed
by state law.
24
Though "under color" of law no longer needed to be state
authorized conduct, some positive involvement by the state was
still necessary. In Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant,25 the
distinction between activities required by the state and those car-
ried out by voluntary choice and without compulsion was discussed.
It was decided that unless actions are performed in obedience to
some positive provision of state law they do not furnish a basis
for action under the fourteenth amendment. 26 Williams v. Hot
17. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); see, e.g., Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
18. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927).
19. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
20. Id. at 326.
21. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
22. Id. at 111.
23. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
24. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Basista v.
Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965); Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th
Cir. 1962).
25. 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
26. Id. at 847.
Shoppes, Inc., 27 involved a state statute that required segregation
of certain public accommodations and the manager of a restaurant
thought it compelled him to refuse service to a Negro. The circuit
court held it possible that the statute might be interpreted as not
applying to restaurants, and for there to be the necessary "state
action" it would have to apply directly to restaurants. The Su-
preme Court further delineated the amount of state involvement
required to constitute "state action" in Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority.28 Burton, a Negro, was refused service in a res-
taurant, operated by a private corporation, under lease in a build-
ing owned by the Parking Authority, an agency of the state. The
Court found that the state, through its manifestations (allowing
discrimination in a building owned by it) had become involved to a
significant extent and this constituted the necessary "state action."
Further change in the concept of "state action" was brought
about by the sit-in cases. In Peterson v. City of Greenville,29 and
in Robinson v. Florida,30 the Supreme Court determined that state
statutes requiring segregation in facilities and services in restau-
rants, though obviously unconstitutional and unenforceable, were
in themselves sufficient to constitute "state action." Therefore,
the states could not punish, as trespassers, Negroes who had been
refused service in the restaurants. The Court in Lombard v.
Louisiana,3 1 held that a state could not achieve the result of main-
taining racially segregated private restaurant facilities by official
command of the Chief of Police, whose command had at least as
much coercive effect as an ordinance. Though there were no stat-
utes requiring segregation, the Court held that a state or a city may
act as an authority through its executives just as it can through
its legislative body.3 2 Trespass convictions of Negroes attempting
to be served were reversed.
Possibly the broadest application of the concept of "state action"
to date is the Supreme Court's holding in Reitman v. Mulkey.38
In an action for damages, the Court upheld the right of an in-
dividual to recover against a private landlord where his racial dis-
crimination had been encouraged by the state. In 1965 the Cal-
ifornia Constitution was amended through a state wide referendum
vote, which repealed existing anti-discriminatory housing legisla-
27. 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
28. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
29. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
30. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
31. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
32. Id. at 273.
33. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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tion.34 This amendment gave property owners absolute discretion
to refuse to sell or rent to anyone they chose. The Court held this
amendment to be an unconstitutional state encouragement of ra-
cial discrimination. Though the amendment made no mention of
race or any other specific grounds for discrimination, and techni-
cally was neutral (it did not command anyone to discriminate), it
was still found to be state involvement and encouragement,
thereby meeting the test of "state action."
The now widely used Civil Rights Act of 196435 and the 1871 Ku
Klux Act are both directed towards state encouraged private dis-
crimination although each provides a different remedy. The 1871
Act provides damages relief while the 1964 Act provides only injunc-
tive or removal relief. Judicial interpretation of what constitutes
the necessary state involvement under the 1964 Act and what
constitutes the necessary state involvement under the 1871 Act
appears to be different even though the language of the statutes in
this respect is identical.36 The difference appears to be one of de-
gree of involvement. Amount of state involvement necessary to
establish "state action" under the 1871 Act is greater than the
amount required to show "state action" under the 1964 Act. A
clear cut violation of the 1964 Act will not necessarily establish the
required "state action" to sustain a suit under the 1871 Act. The
Supreme Court, in an interpretation of "state action" under the
1964 Act, set aside a state criminal trespass conviction in Harm v.
City of Rock Hill,37 holding that the defendant had a right to be
served at a lunch counter, and the refusal of service and subsequent
34. CALIF. CoNsT. art. 1, § 26, states in pertinent part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall
deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any per-
son, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of
his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to
such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964), in essence . . . provides for injunctive re-
lief or removal from state courts in cases where discrimination or segrega-
tion has occurred in places of public accommodation. This includes dis-
crimination carried out under color of state law, statutes, ordinances or
regulations, or carried on under color of custom or usage. For the pur-
poses of this statute, public accommodations include, among other things,
restaurants and lunch counters.
36. Ku Klux Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), and Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
37. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
arrest was in violation of the 1964 Act. In Georgia v. Rachel"8
the Court set aside a trespass conviction and held that the de-
fendant had the right to remain and be served at a restaurant.
Refusal of service and arrest was in violation of the 1964 Act. In
Achtenburg v. Mississippi 9 the circuit court directed that the
criminal (vagrancy) charges against Miss Adickes be dismissed,
holding that there had been a violation of the 1964 Act.40 But
in Miss Adickes' suit against Kress, neither the trial court nor the
court of appeals felt there was the necessary state involvement to
sustain an action under section 1983.
Alternative methods of accomplishing reversal were available to
the Supreme Court in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & CO.41 First, and
probably the easiest approach, would have been for the Court to
examine the Mississippi trespass statute,42 apply the Reitman stand-
ard, declare the statute unconstitutional, and rule that it encour-
aged discrimination, thereby finding the necessary "state action."
4 3
Had the Court done this it would have acted consistently with
Reitman and a further clarification of the concept of "state action"
would have been accomplished. By not doing so it would appear
that the Court is tacitly approving a double standard; one for civil
rights in the area of property ownership and a different one for
civil rights in the more intangible area of human rights. Secondly,
38. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
39. 393 F.2d 468 (Sth Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 474. The charge of vagrancy was labeled utterly baseless.
41. 398 U.S. 144.
42. Mss. CoDE 1942, § 2046.5, states in pertinent part:
(1) Every person, firm or corporation engaged in any public
business, trade or profession of any kind whatsoever in the State
of Mississippi, including, but not restricted to, . . . restaurants
dining room or lunch counters . . . , is hereby authorized and
empowered to choose or select the person or persons he or it de-
sires to do business with, and is further authorized and empow-
ered to refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve any person ....
(3) Any person who enters a public place of business ... and
is requested or ordered to leave therefrom ... and ... refuses
so to do, shall be guilty of a trespass ....
43. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 188. Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring and dissenting in part, makes a thorough examination of the
Mississippi trespass statute and the historical context in which it was en-
acted. Through this, and looking to the overall scheme of Mississippi's
encouragement of discrimination, he would declare the statute an uncon-
stitutional encouragement of racial discrimination and thereby find the
necessary "state action." Mr. Justice Brennan also rejects the majority's
intimation that private discrimination might be "state action" only where
the private person acted under compulsion imposed by the state. He
contends that Peterson and Lombard establish that when a state policy en-
forces private discrimination in places of public accommodation, it
makes such private discrimination unconstitutional "state action," regard-
less of whether or not the discrimination was motivated or influenced by it.
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the Court could have eliminated the difference between "state ac-
tion" or "under color" of law under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
the meaning of those terms under the 1871 Act. By simply holding
that the requirement of "under color" of law of section 1983 shall
be the same as that of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and shall be ap-
plied accordingly, the Court could have established a single stand-
ard that would have been a giant step forward in the elimination of
the evils of racial discrimination. Thirdly, and undoubtedly the
most radical approach, the Court could have eliminated the need
for "state action" (in regard to facilities held open to the public) as
a requirement to show a violation of rights protected under the
fourteenth amendment, by extending the holding of United States
v. Guest.4 4 In Guest Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring and dissent-
ing in part, said:
A majority of the members of the Court expresses the view today
that § 5 [of the fourteenth amendment] empowers Congress to en-
act laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of
Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not state officers or
others acting under color of state law are implicated in the con-
spiracy.45
As the Court determined in Marsh v. Alabama:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for the use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.46
There is no aura of constitutional protected privacy about a res-
taurant, as there is about one's home. Access by the public is the
very reason for its existence. This approach might not be as radi-
cal as would appear at first glance for there is some support for
such a holding.
47
Instead of taking any of the alternative approaches discussed
above, the Court, through an examination of the legislative intent
and history of judicial interpretation of the 1871 Act, chose to
reaffirm the need for "state action." It did however, broaden
the range of what constitutes "state action" in the area of "custom
or usage" as set out in section 1983. "Custom or usage" arguments
44. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
45. Id. at 782.
46. 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
47. See Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action"
Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLU. L. REV. 855 (1966).
have been employed previously in attempts to convince courts that
acts of discrimination were in violation of rights protected under
the fourteenth amendment. But the courts have been very quick
to find that there was no "custom or usage" or to rule that there
was no "state action" involved in any "custom or usage."'' 8  Pre-
viously the courts have rejected "custom or usage" arguments by
the expedience of the supposition that the customs of the peo-
ple of a state do not constitute "state action" within the pro-
hibition of the fourteenth amendment and looking no further.
The Adickes Court likewise determined that the customs of the peo-
ple do not constitute "state action" but it went on to hold that if
these customs had the force of law by virtue of persistent prac-
tices of state officials they would constitute "state action" within
the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment. The Court im-
plied that private discrimination might be "state action" only where
the private person acted because he was motivated by a state
enforced custom. 49 The Court fairly well summed up its holding
in the statement:
For state action purposes it makes no difference of course
whether the racially discriminatory act by the private party is com-
pelled by a statutory provision or by a custom having the force of
law-in either case it is the State that has commanded the result
by its law.50
At this time there is not, and probably never will be, a uniform
criteria for determining if a "custom or usage" has or does not
have the force of law necessary to constitute "state action." Obvi-
ously this will have to be decided on a case by case basis. But the
Court did set some guidelines applicable to the instant case. Both
the district court 51 and the majority opinion of the court of ap-
peals52 held that for the relevant "custom" to have the force of
law it would be necessary to show that the "custom" existed
throughout the entire state. The Supreme Court rejected this
and held it was not necessary for the "custom" to be state wide,
but it could have the force of law even if it was a "custom"
within a political subdivision of a state. 3 The Court determined
48. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121 (2nd Cir. 1968);
Williams v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 323 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1963); Williams
v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Slack v. Atlantic White
Tower System, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124, aff'd. 284 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1960);
Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1959).
49. But see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 192 (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. at 251-53 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
50. 398 U.S. at 171.
51. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 252 F. Supp. 140.
52. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121.
53. 398 U.S. at 173.
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that proof relevant to showing a "custom" need not be a demon-
stration of a specific practice as a "custom," but the showing of a
long standing and still prevailing state enforced "custom" that
would encompass the particular kind of practice challenged would
be adequate.5 4 The Court held as being too restrictive any sugges-
tion that the exclusive means available for demonstrating state en-
forcement of a "custom" would be by showing that the State used a
criminal statute for this purpose. "[A] state official might act to
give a custom the force of law in a variety of ways .... -55 In the
instant case, petitioner might be able to show that when the police
subjected her to false arrest for vagrancy, they were in fact en-
forcing a prevailing "custom" of racial segregation and the arrest
was only to harass and punish her for her association with Ne-
groes.56 Or Miss Adickes might be able to show that the local
police encouraged the enforcement of a "custom" of segregating the
races in restaurants by intentionally tolerating violence or threats
of violence directed at those who violated the "custom."57  "[S] et-
tled practices of state officials may, by imposing sanctions or with-
holding benefits, transform private predilections into compulsory
rules of behavior no less than legislative pronouncements."58
RICHARD H. MCCLURE
SELECTIVE SERVICE-CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS-SECTION 6(j)
REQUIRES DEFERMENT FOR REGISTRANTS WHOSE BELIEFS EMANATE
FROM ETHICAL OR MORAL BASES. Welsh v. United States (U.S.
1970)
Elliott Ashton Welsh II was convicted in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California of refusing to sub-
mit to induction into the armed forces in violation of the Military
54. Id.
55. Id. at 172.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 168.
